The first requirement of success in foreign policy is to know your friends, and know your adversaries. Unfortunately, most Americans know very little about Iran, and the debate over Iran policy in the American media often betrays a deep misunderstanding of even the most basic facts about Iran (like who calls the shots there).

This page offers a short primer on the essentials of Iran's internal governing structure -- with a focus on national security and foreign policy -- and the beliefs of those who hold power in Iran.

Key Facts

President Ahmadinejad is clearly influential, but he cannot make decisions on nuclear and foreign policy without the consent of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has grabbed the world's attention with his inflammatory and sometimes offensive statements.  But he does not call the shots on Iran's nuclear and foreign policy.  The ultimate decision-maker is Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the commander-in-chief of Iran's forces.

The Supreme Leader is appointed by the Assembly of Experts (a collection of clerics), and serves for life unless recalled by the Assembly of Experts (which has never happened in the past and is highly unlikely to happen in the future).

The main decision-making body on national security and foreign policy is the Supreme National Security Council, which is chaired by Ahmadinejad and in which the Leader has two representatives.  As the June election dramatized, there is a lot of political competition below the Supreme Leader, and this competition carries over into the SNSC.  It includes both loyalists and people who have been openly and sharply critical of Ahmadinejad.

For example, Hassan Rowhani, the Supreme Leader's representative to the SNSC, publicly castigated Ahmadinejad for the obstructionist tactics that led to UN Security Council sanctions being imposed on Iran -- and also criticized Ahmadinejad for his foolish rhetoric on the Holocaust.  Ali Larijani resigned as the secretary of SNSC because of disagreements over style and tactics with Ahmadinejad, but still serves on the SNSC in his capacity as Speaker of the Parliament.

The Supreme Leader is also advised on domestic and foreign policy by the Expediency Council, which is headed by former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Although the Leader recently said that his views are close to Ahmadinejad than Rafsanjani, the advisory role of the Council is still significant.

The Islamic Revolution's Guard Corp (IRGC) is also a very powerful force in Iran, but its leaders have repeatedly re-affirmed their commitment to preserving the Iranian Constitution, the Islamic Revolution, and what they consider to be the foundation of the Islamic Revolution, the Office of the Supreme Leader.  The commanders of the IRGC are members of SNSC and exert their influence through that body.  Their influence has grown in domestic affairs, but their clear mission is to ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic, not engage in acts that would threaten such survival.

The Supreme Leader loathes Israel and is deeply suspicious of the United States.  But far from the messianic or suicidal caricature sometimes found in western media, Khamenei's track record over twenty years in power reveals a calculating and pragmatic decision-maker who has resolutely pursued two paramount goals: (1) ensuring the survival of the Islamic Republic as an islamic republic with himself in charge, and (2) achieving recognition and acceptance of Iran as a major power in the region.  For example:

During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran took the pragmatic step of developing secret ties and trading arms with Israel, even as Iran and Israel denounced each other in public.¹

In the 1990s, Iran chose a closer relationship with Russia over support for rebellious Chechen Muslims.

Right after 9/11, Iran worked with the United States to get rid of the Taliban in Afghanistan, including paying for the Afghan troops serving under U.S. command. Iran helped establish the U.S.-backed government and then contributed more than $750 million to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and then sought broader talks aimed at improving relations with the United States generally. ²

Iran has ceased its efforts to export the Islamic revolution to other Persian Gulf states, in favor of developing good relations with the governments of those states.³

There is no realistic alternative to dealing with those who hold power in Iran.  Negotiating with a country's leaders does not legitimate those leaders.  It simply reflects practical necessity.  The United States talked to Stalin's Russia and Mao's China without it ever being suggested that the American government approved of those regimes.

Moreover, on the issue that matters most, the nuclear file, there has long been a broad consensus in Iran behind asserting Iran's right to enrich uranium under safeguards for peaceful use.  That consensus led Iran to suspend uranium enrichment in 2004-2005 -- and accept broad-ranging safeguards as confidence-building measures -- when Tehran had hopes that doing so might bring the United States and its allies to accept some enrichment in Iran under strict safeguards.  And it then led Iran to walk away from the table, resume enrichment, and reduce its cooperation with the IAEA when Iran concluded that the west would not accept enrichment in Iran on any terms.

The chief obstacle to progress in the nuclear talks now is not domestic turmoil in Iran but the years-old issue of enrichment.