It is widely known that Iran and Israel have adopted a very confrontational posture toward each other.  It is also clear that Israel is urging the United States to adopt a similar position towards Iran.  In July 2008, Israel reportedly sought U.S. clearance to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities, and was denied.¹ Prime Minister Netanyahu met with President Obama on May 18 once again to discuss options for a military response to the Iranian nuclear challenge.²

Israel is reportedly willing to defer to President Obama's preference for dialogue with Iran, but only for a short period and subject to strict conditions. more

In fact, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh is reported to have told the Sunday Times in October, “If no crippling sanctions are in place by Christmas, Israel will strike Iran. If Israel is left alone, Israel will act alone.”

America has a special relationship with Israel and a long-standing and deep commitment to promoting the security and prosperity of Israel.  The question is how best to achieve that in dealing with Iran.

Key Points

Nations do not always act in their own best interest, and Israel's current position on Iran is a case in point.

It's not hard to see why Israel is concerned about Iran.  Just look at Ahmadinejad's loathsome questioning of the Holocaust and Iran's persistent support for Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups that have launched armed attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians.

But Israel's current proposal for dealing with Iran is a classic example of passions clouding judgment, leading down a path that will undermine the security of both Israel and the United States.

Contrary to the past assertions of Israel's current Prime Minister, Iran is not an existential threat to Israel.

Even Israel's own defense minister, Ehud Barak, does not share the prime minister's exaggerated assessment of the Iranian threat.⁴ Iran's defense spending is a small fraction of Israel's and a tiny fraction of America's.  Apart from the Iran-Iraq war, which Saddam Hussein clearly started, Iran has not launched an attack across another country's borders in over 100 years.  Despite Khamenei's and Ahmadinejad's frequently hostile rhetoric, the history of Iran's actions makes crystal clear that national self-preservation and regional influence - not some quest for martyrdom in the service of Islam - is Iran's main foreign policy goal. more

An Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would be ill-advised and counter-productive. It would increase the threat to Israel from Iran, rather than reducing it.

Absent any evidence in word or deed that Iran is preparing to attack Israel, an Israeli attack on Iran would grossly violate international law, isolate the United States and Israel (not Iran) in world opinion, and unify the Iranian people against the United States and Israel for a long time to come.  It also would very likely spread chaos in the region, putting American troops at risk in Iraq and Afghanistan where Iran wields great influence, and triggering attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians by Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Gaza.⁵

What would Israel gain?  Over the medium to longer term, as Secretary Gates has pointed out, an Israeli attack on Iran's open and IAEA-safeguarded facilities would set back Iran's nuclear program by a few years at most, while leading to the immediate expulsion of all IAEA inspectors, driving Iran's nuclear program completely out of sight and further underground.⁶

Ultimately, the most likely consequence of a military attack is the opposite of the one intended:  it would do more to provoke an Iranian nuclear weapon than to prevent one, just as Israel's ill-conceived raid on the Osirak reactor in 1981 caused Saddam Hussein to intensify -- not abandon -- his nuclear weapons program.⁷

Moreover, threats of attack have been circulating for so long without action that Tehran appears to have largely discounted them.  It is not clear what they are accomplishing at this point, beyond poisoning the atmosphere.

Intensified financial sanctions can cause considerable pain in Iran, but the quest for "crippling" sanctions is unlikely to attract broad international support and is unlikely to cripple Iran.

Tightening financial sanctions at the margin can help raise the cost of defiance and focus the mind during negotiations.  But any effort to "cripple" the Iranian economy with draconian new sanctions (such a gasoline embargo), though emotionally satisfying to some in Israel and the west, is highly likely to backfire in Iran.

Close analysis shows that the Iranian people will be harmed while their hardline rulers are empowered -- the exact opposite of the intended result.  And since most Iranians, reformers and hardliners, see the present dispute (rightly or wrongly) as about Iran's right to enrich uranium for peaceful use, they will blame the west, not Ahmadinejad, for their pain.

By contrast, a U.S. policy of seeking detente with Iran could benefit Israel as well as America.

Given the current facts on the ground, negotiation offers by far the best prospect for resolving the nuclear standoff on terms that promote Israel's and America's security.  This could be done by ending Iranian enrichment or at least locking Iran into a comprehensive system of nationwide safeguards and surveillance that offers the best chance of detecting and deterring any future nuclear weapons program.

Easing tensions with Iran could also help Israel in other ways.  Experts believe that one major motive behind Iran's support for the military wings of Hamas and Hezbollah is to deter a feared Israeli attack by preserving the capacity for retaliation through "asymmetric warfare" in Lebanon and Gaza if Iran is attacked.  Easing the external threat from Israel obviously will reduce this incentive.⁸

Broad-ranging talks with Iran also offer a natural forum for the United States to raise the issue of Iran's support for Hamas and Hezbollah within a larger framework that offers Iran economic and political incentives for compromise.  If these talks result in Iran's channeling its support to these actors more towards peaceful, political activity, that would benefit Israel's security.⁹

As Shlomo Ben Ami, the former foreign minister of Israel, observed in 2006: "Iran is not driven by an obsession to destroy Israel, but by its determination to preserve its regime and establish itself as a strategic regional power . . . The answer to the Iranian threat is a policy of detente, which would change the Iranian elite's pattern of conduct." ¹⁰

On a parallel track, any U.S. moves towards mediating the Arab-Israeli crisis in a balanced way would bolster hopes in the region for a peaceful settlement of that dispute, making it increasingly costly for Iran to support extremist elements within Hamas and Hezbollah.

Already there are signs that President Obama's more balanced approach to the Arab-Israeli peace process is beginning to pay dividends in building support in the region -- and even perhaps within Hamas -- for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

There has been much debate between Israel and the United States, and within the Western media, over which should come first:  addressing the Iranian threat, or re-energizing the Arab-Israeli peace process.¹¹

This is a false choice.

Re-energizing the Arab-Israeli peace process and repairing the U.S.-Iran relationship should be seen not as competing alternatives, but as a tandem. Together, they improve prospects for a peaceful and secure Middle East, while providing strong, parallel incentives for Iran to play a neutral or facilitating -- rather than a spoiler -- role in the Israel-Palestinian dispute.