Dealing with Iran in Iraq

On 28 January 2010, Iranian troops withdrew from positions around the al-Fakkah oil rig just inside the Iraqi border, marking the end of a six-week standoff between the two countries.[1] Further south, tensions continue to mount amid Iraqi accusations of Iranian pollution of the shared waterway that marks the countries’ southern boundary.[2]

In Iraq, the issue of actual or perceived Iranian influence is a perennial political hot button – hardly a surprise given the complex ties of trade, religion and kin that bind the two countries, and the devastating war they fought in the 1980s. Some analysts see an Iranian role in disqualifying some 500 Sunni candidates from the upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections on the basis of alleged ties to Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party.[3]

Tensions over Iranian influence in Iraqi domestic politics are intensified by the fact that fundamental issues involving allocation of power and wealth among Sunnis, Shias and Kurds remain unresolved. These groups have not yet shown they can manage their own internal rivalries, much less resolve major differences with each other.[4]

As the U.S. seeks to rein in Tehran’s nuclear ambitions while it withdraws troops from Iraq, policy makers should bear these two principles in mind:

1. Seek neutral mediators: Disputes between Iran and Iraq are inevitable given the two states’ history of animosity, and extensive cross-border flows of people and goods. But, despite continued U.S. sway in Iraqi politics, Washington’s hostility with Tehran makes any attempt to resolve disputes between the two neighbors more likely to backfire than to succeed. In addition, American sensitivities towards working with some actors on the Iranian side further undercut its ability to mediate.[5] Washington should encourage Iran and Iraq to negotiate their issues bilaterally, and, failing that, through a more neutral state, like Turkey or Qatar.

2. Iran’s influence in Iraq is an opportunity, not a threat: Despite their many differences, the United States and Iran have some coincident interests in Iraq. Both countries favor a stable and unified Iraq (chaos in Iraq will send further waves of refugees spilling into Iran). Both countries favor democracy in Iraq (democracy naturally favors the majority Shia population in Iraq). Both sides support Iraq’s Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki. These common interests suggest the outlines of a strategy that seeks to bind Iran and Iraq together into a regional security apparatus, rather than playing them off against each other as in the past.

Background

The vast majority of Iranians are Persian-speaking Shia Muslims, while Arabic-speaking Iraq is divided between roughly 60% Shia and 40% Sunni. For generations, Iranian Shia have followed the pilgrimage routes to holy places in Iraq, intermarried and carried goods along the way.

From 1980 to 1988, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq fought revolutionary Iran in the bloodiest war in the history of the modern Middle East, a searing experience that continues to color bilateral relations between the two states today.[6]

During the war, Saddam Hussein expected Iranian Sunnis to side with Iraq, while Ayatollah Khomeini incited Iraqi Shia to rise-up and back Iran. Neither happened; the Iraqi Shia stayed loyal to Baghdad while Iranian Sunnis backed Tehran, and the war concluded with a peace agreement that reverted to the territorial status quo of 1980.

The United States took complex, sometimes contradictory, stances during the war. Washington sought to weaken revolutionary Iran, while at the same time preventing Iraq from becoming too powerful. The Reagan Administration may have turned a blind eye towards Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops and Kurdish civilians,[7] while some U.S. officials sought to win over Iranian moderates by secretly selling them weaponry – a move that scandalized Washington when discovered.[8]

The aim of simultaneously containing the Islamic Republic and Saddam’s Iraq, which by the late 1980s had become a full-fledged U.S. enemy, was reborn under the Clinton Administration as “dual containment,” a policy of playing the states off against one another in an effort to ensure that neither became too powerful.

[4] Joost Hilterman, “The U.S. Exit from Iraq: How to Steer Clear of Danger,” Christian Science Monitor, 27 March 2009. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6028&l=1 ("As violence has abated, politics remains highly dysfunctional. Fundamental conflicts over power (how to divide it), territory (how to allocate disputed areas, especially oil-rich Kirkuk) and resources (how to manage them and share oil income) simmer without prospect of early resolution and will determine what happens to Iraq when the US leaves."

[5] For example, The Economist withdrew reports last November that U.S. general Odierno had met with General Qassem Suleimani of the Iranian Quds Force in an attempt to mediate questions of Iranian influence in Iraq. Such a meeting would have been politically explosive in Washington, which considers the Quds Force, Iran’s main proxy in Iraq, to be a political pariah.

[6] Commonly-cited estimates hold that one million were killed between the two sides, although this has been challenged by some.

[7] This point is exhaustively explored in Hilterman’s A Poisonous Affair.

[8] Trita Parsi makes a convincing case for Washington’s aims to co-opt and empower Iranian moderates through missile sales in Treacherous Alliance.

Gateway to Iran

Counter Arguments

The Iran debate is rich in misconceptions. Following are a few succinct responses to some of the most prominent ones.

Iran is aiding militias that have killed U.S. soldiers in Iraq

Disclaimer

This site reflects the input of a large group of experts with diverse knowledge, experience and affiliations. The views expressed on this site do not reflect the position of any organization with which these experts may be affiliated. Nor do they necessarily reflect the position of all group members. While all members strongly support the general policy thrust and judgments reflected on this site, they may not necessarily all concur with every specific assertion or recommendation contained therein.

Dealing with Iran in Iraq

Background

Further Reading

Counter Arguments

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