How to Approach the Iran Nuclear Dilemma: White Paper by the Iran Nuclear Policy Group of the American Foreign Policy Project

America has elected Barack Obama with a resounding mandate for change. In the realm of foreign policy, there are few if any areas where a change of course is more clearly needed than in the critical area of U.S. policy towards Iran's nuclear program.

Nuclear talks with Iran are deadlocked.  Iran continues to enrich uranium. It refuses to fully answer certain questions about alleged past weapons work. And it won't allow the IAEA full access to Iranian scientists and facilities.

Meanwhile, concerns have been raised that Iran is "pursuing nuclear weapons." Pressure is mounting on the President to deliver an ultimatum to Iran that it must immediately suspend all enrichment of uranium or face draconian economic sanctions, or worse. Israel has reportedly sought U.S. acquiescence or support for an Israeli attack if Iran does not halt all enrichment - soon. Against this turbulent background, the Obama Administration is reviewing its options.

All agree on the goal: preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. The question is how best to achieve it. Analysis shows that any bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities would almost certainly backfire: failing to stop the program while wasting lives, fomenting extremism, and damaging the long-term security of both the United States and Israel. Multiple UN Security Council resolutions, backed by economic sanctions, have not improved Iran's policies from our perspective, and have probably entrenched them.  For reasons explained below, we judge that prospects for successfully coercing Iran through enhanced economic sanctions are remote at best.

Fortunately, we are not forced to choose between a coercive strategy that has clearly failed and a military option with very little chance of success. This paper lays out a three-step strategy for making America more secure - through true diplomacy. The Annex answers several common questions about Iran's nuclear program and our proposed response.

1. Get the facts; don't hype the threat

Although we often hear it said or implied that Iran is clearly pursuing nuclear weapons, the facts are more complex than that.

The Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair has just re-affirmed the December 2007 finding that Iran shut down its weaponization and covert enrichment activities in Fall 2003, with no evidence of a re-start.  What we know Iran to be doing is enriching uranium at Natanz, openly under IAEA safeguards, and improving its ability to enrich more efficiently, while slowly accumulating a small stockpile of low-enriched uranium.  It is also building a heavy-water reactor at Arak. These projects will shorten the lead-time for developing a nuclear weapon, should Iran decide to do so in the future. That is the sense in which, as Mr. Blair puts it, we know Iran to be "developing a nuclear weapon capability" and "preserving a weapons option."

In practice, Iran's current path preserves at least three different options, the first and last of which are not mutually exclusive: (a) pursuing enrichment for nuclear energy use as a source of national pride and a symbol of Iran's refusal to be cowed, (b) using its enrichment as a bargaining chip in larger negotiations with the United States and its allies, or (c) pursuing a weapon either to deter a feared U.S. or Israeli attack, or to support aggressive goals, including expanding its influence in the region.  The U.S. intelligence community believes that Iran probably has not yet made a firm decision with regard to nuclear weapons, and that decision may well depend in large part on what the United States and its allies do.

According to U.S. intelligence community estimates, Iran is not expected to accumulate enough fissile material for even a single weapon until sometime in the 2010-2015 time frame, and that would require a "break-out" that almost certainly would be detected. What this means, in Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' words, is that: "They're not close to a stockpile, they're not close to a weapon at this point, and so there is some time."  The only effective way to illuminate - and, if necessary, constructively alter - Iran's intentions is to use that time for skillful and careful diplomacy.

Meanwhile, publicly assuming the worst in the absence of evidence - and issuing an immediate ultimatum based on that assumption -- is a singularly bad idea. It will provoke a needless confrontation if the assumption is wrong. It will deprive Iran of a face-saving way to shift course if the worst-case assumption is correct. And continuing to threaten to bomb Iran - as Israel is doing - is the best way imaginable to make the worst-case scenario a self-fulfilling prophecy.

2. Focus on transparency

In setting goals for diplomacy, U.S. policy-makers should be guided by one basic question: What observable policy changes by Iran that are realistically achievable will make us most secure, given that Iran's present intentions are unknown?

"Give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons" is not a meaningful demand since Iran denies it is pursuing weapons and the United States has no clear evidence with which to dispute that denial.

Past U.S. policy has focused to the point of obsession on forcing Iran to (a) answer all questions about alleged past weapons work, (b) suspend its open and safeguarded enrichment at Natanz, and (c) stop construction of a heavy-water reactor at Arak. Alliances have been built, UN resolutions pushed through, and sanctions imposed -- all for the purpose of pressuring Iran to submit to these three demands.

The third objective responds to a longer-term concern and can be readily incorporated into the diplomatic strategy that we propose.  However, in our judgment the first two of these objectives are simply the wrong priorities.  Iran has shown no indication that it is willing to take such actions, even under international pressure, and focusing on these demands comes at the expense of other achievable steps that would provide greater benefit to our security. Rather than simply take up where the Bush Administration left off, the Obama Administration needs to re-think its objectives with three key points in mind:

(a) Open, declared, safeguarded enrichment is not the greatest threat. Let us suppose for the sake of contingency planning that Iran were to decide to pursue a nuclear weapon.  How would it do so?  U.S. officials are not unjustified in worrying that Iran might close off access to the Natanz facility, evict inspectors, and start transforming its low-enriched uranium into high-enriched weapons material. North Korea did something analogous with spent reactor fuel and plutonium a few years ago. It's a most unlikely scenario, however, in the case of Iran. Any such maneuver would be immediately known, confronting Iran with a high risk of a forceful response, from Israel if not others.  This being so, any Iranian decision to pursue a weapon would much more likely follow a clandestine path.

(b) Focus on transparency. Past U.S. policy has so fixated on stopping all open, safeguarded enrichment in Iran that it has left itself half-blind to the more consequential risk of a clandestine program, should Iran decide to pursue a weapon.

Guarding against the clandestine risk requires, first and foremost, getting Iran to resume implementing the co-called "Additional Protocol" to each country's Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. The Additional Protocol is not a panacea. One still needs intelligence to tell the IAEA where to look. But with the Additional Protocol one has a way of confirming or denying suspicions of clandestine nuclear work furnished by intelligence. Without it, there is none.

Adherence to the Protocol is voluntary, however. Brazil is pursuing enrichment, but hasn't signed the Protocol. Iran signed the Protocol and had been voluntarily implementing it, but stopped doing so in response to UN sanctions aimed at stopping Iran's safeguarded enrichment.

Iran has offered to resume applying the Additional Protocol and possibly accept other safeguards in the context of an overall settlement. There is only one way to find out whether this offer is serious or not, and what its contours are: start talking to Iran.

(c) The West probably can't have it all. Ideally, of course, one would get it all.  Iran would simply capitulate: stop enriching, come clean about its past and resume implementation of the Additional Protocol. In the real world, this is unlikely to happen, and it is vitally important that the best not become the enemy of the good.

While the Additional Protocol probably should be required of all nations who engage in nuclear activities, it is currently a voluntary arrangement that has to be bargained for. Moreover, as the relevant UN Security Council resolutions acknowledge, Iran is entitled under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and that right has long been understood to encompass enrichment under safeguards. Nothing in the NPT or Iran's Safeguards Agreement supports the notion that a country is barred from enriching uranium if it has ever pursued a weapons program, even one halted years ago.

What this means is that the dispute that has put Iran at loggerheads with the West is not over whether Iran may enrich uranium. It is over whether Iran must first suspend enrichment for a period and answer all questions about allegations of past weapons work to regain the "confidence" of the international community - before resuming enrichment.

In our judgment, this difference is not so fundamental as to be worth the conflict it has evoked. Achieving a temporary suspension of open and safeguarded enrichment at the cost of the Additional Protocol would be a pyrrhic victory - and might well just drive enrichment underground. And forcing Iran to answer potentially embarrassing questions about the past is far less important than safeguarding the future.   There is a better approach set forth below.

The Outlines of a Deal. Iran has made a huge political and economic investment in enrichment, which it is not likely to scrap, at least not soon. Wise diplomacy would set aside the inflexible demand for immediate suspension of enrichment in favor of a two-part approach: (1) advance agreement on a reasonable time period for negotiations accompanied by a freeze on enrichment capacity in Iran in exchange for a freeze on western sanctions during this interval; (2) over the longer term, either cessation of enrichment or a low cap on enrichment capacity accompanied by a robust package of transparency and control measures that maximize our security.

This package of transparency and control measures would include firm, binding commitments: to implement the Additional Protocol; to declare new nuclear facilities before construction begins; to convert the Arak heavy water plant to a more practical and proliferation-resistant light-water reactor; to install remote camera surveillance at all nuclear facilities; and possibly to agree to stockpile low-enriched uranium in proliferation-resistant "uranium oxide" form.  Iranian officials have expressed interest in running Iran's uranium enrichment program through a multinational consortium. This would put foreign technicians on the ground in Iran, thereby improving transparency and monitoring capacity.  It is a promising idea and should be explored.

To deter a "soft breakout" the West should seek to negotiate a series of default conditions (barring inspectors, diversion of material, or any production of high-enriched uranium, along with a catchall condition to cover unforeseen contingencies), breach of which would be deemed an unequivocal violation of the agreement. This will greatly facilitate and legitimate a forceful response should such a condition occur and require such a response.

Such measures would make all countries safer than they are now. Unlike zero enrichment, Iran has not ruled them out.

3. Try true diplomacy

Through endless repetition the myth has taken hold in some quarters that nuclear diplomacy with Iran has been tried and failed, leaving no recourse but threats and sanctions. In fact, the opposite is true. For five years until nearly the end of its term, the Bush Administration refused to talk to Iran at all about nuclear issues -- because Iran would not comply with U.S. demands that it first suspend all enrichment. This strategy merely squandered time: while the U.S. sat silent, Iran continued to enrich. Moreover, without the United States - the world's sole superpower and Iran's chief nemesis - at the table, Iran had little reason to talk seriously with the polite interlocutors (mainly three European countries) that remained.

Meanwhile, years of threats and sanctions have not weakened - in fact, they have probably entrenched - Iran's commitment to enriching. We see no evidence to support the prediction that escalating sanctions now will yield better results. On the contrary, even proponents admit that international support for toughened sanctions tied to enrichment has lost momentum since the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate found that Iran has stopped weapons work. Moreover, after having overtures to the United States rebuffed in 2001-2003, Iran's Supreme Leader has concluded that caving to pressure merely invites more pressure.

The last, best hope for a sanctions-focused strategy is a gasoline embargo on Iran, and it's a loser. Iran supplies 70 percent of its gasoline demand internally. There are thousands of suppliers in world markets who will line up to supply the remainder. Hugo Chavez's refineries alone could easily break the embargo unless it is enforced by a naval blockade, an act of war. Iran's rationing system will make sure that the elites and the military get their gasoline. Only the poor and middle class will suffer and they will blame America for their hardship, not their government.

The United States has significant leverage over Iran, but it lies mainly not in the bad things America can do to Iran but in things Iran needs that the United States can withhold: an end to isolation, a place at the regional table, help in developing Iran's oil and gas fields, restoration of foreign investment.

Positive leverage, however, cannot be wielded effectively with negative diplomacy.  The problem with a "carrots and sticks" strategy - whether called by that name or not - is that carrots and sticks deployed together tend to cancel each other out, the anger caused by the sticks nullifying the appeal of the carrots. This problem was clearly illustrated by Supreme Leader Khamenei's  response to President Obama's gracious Nowruz speech: "you say ‘we will talk with Iran while we will put pressure on them as well - both threat and inducement.' You cannot talk to our nation this way."

An effective strategy on the Iran nuclear file would include two main elements:

1. Consult with allies to effect the change of objectives and approach outlined above -- from (a) a maximalist/coercive strategy that demands an immediate end to all enrichment under threat of sanctions, to (b) a proactive, positive position that holds out the prospect of tangible benefits and progress towards normalization of relations, in exchange for Iran's agreement to convert the Arak reactor to a light-water reactor while accepting either zero or limited enrichment within the highly protective and transparent safeguards framework outlined above. Any movement away from "zero" should depend on Iran accepting suitable safeguards to reflect the special concerns raised by that activity and Iran's past conduct, with "nothing agreed until everything is agreed."

2. Embed nuclear talks within a broader opening to Iran. President Obama's Nowruz speech is a good beginning as is the invitation for Iran to consult with the United States on Afghanistan. Possible further actions: (a) cease any remaining covert action against Iran; (b) lift the ban on informal diplomatic contacts, the main effect of which is to keep U.S. policymakers needlessly in the dark, (c) take concrete steps to ease travel between the two countries, including direct air flights, and (d) pursue an "incidents-at-sea" agreement to prevent confrontations at sea, such as the Iranian speedboat incident in 2008, that could lead to larger conflict. This is not a "grand bargain" but simply a broader context for nuclear discussions that builds confidence and gives both sides a greater stake in the relationship.

Conclusion

For five years, efforts to coerce Iran to stop enriching and answer potentially embarrassing questions have failed. Sharpening the sticks and sweetening the carrots will not change that.

The current path leads only to a painful choice between escalating to armed conflict or backing down in embarrassment. A change of course is needed. We expect hardliners in Tehran will crow over any concession that opens the door to the possibility of enrichment in Iran. In diplomacy, as in war, however, a tactical shift to more defensible terrain is often the key to success.

What is needed now is a calm, firm, measured and principled response that clearly defines and protects U.S. vital interests; respects the rights and legitimate interests of Iran; and finds a way for Iran to accommodate U.S. core interests while also advancing its own. This statement has outlined the key elements of a diplomatic strategy that we believe meets these conditions and has the best chance of succeeding.

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Annex A

Questions and Answers about a Proactive Strategy

Q:  How can you say Iran's intentions are ambiguous when there is absolutely no economic justification for Iran to be enriching uranium?

A:  It is not just we who are saying Iran's intentions are unclear. That is the conclusion of the U.S. intelligence community, which may understand that economics is not the issue.  All kinds of governments pursue programs for political purposes that lack clear, ex-ante, cost-benefit rationale.  Conservatives have complained about this tendency in our own government for decades. Across the length and breadth of Iranian society -- from reformers to hardliners -- enrichment has become for Iranians a matter of national entitlement and a source of pride in technological advancement not unlike our own moon landing. Moreover, five years of Bush Administration ultimatums and Western pressure aimed at forcing Iran to stop all enrichment have made enrichment an ongoing emblem of Iran's independence and refusal to be cowed. The commercial unprofitability of this new Iranian industry is beside the point in the context of a high-priority, government program freighted with symbolic significance.

These observations do not prove Iran's peaceful intentions, but they do, in our view, expose as false the certainty so often expressed by those who "just know" that Iran is pursuing a weapon.

Q:   What about the inability of the IAEA to conclude that "there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran"?

A.     It doesn't build confidence.  But the public should understand that a favorable declaration requires essentially proving a negative, and the IAEA sets a very high bar for doing so.  For example, the Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy reported in 2006 that the IAEA applies the same "unable to conclude" status to every country that had not accepted the Additional Protocol at that time, and to 40 nations that had accepted it. The IAEA has declared, repeatedly, that it has found no evidence of Iranian diversion of nuclear material to proscribed purposes. 

Q:   If you don't know Iran's intentions, doesn't it make sense to stop them from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability?

A.    Yes, if you can. Unfortunately, however, the NPT does not prohibit parties from enriching uranium for peaceful use. Until that is changed, the only issue in this case is whether or not Iran must first answer questions about the past and suspend enrichment for a decent interval - before resuming enrichment. Developing enrichment capacity may be considered by some as tantamount to a "nuclear weapons capability" but it is certainly legal, for peaceful use, and cannot be denied Iran indefinitely.  Iranian officials have suggested that Tehran is willing to explore a multi-national enrichment option. This option, with a strong program of surveillance, may well supply the best and most attainable prevention against a nuclear weapons program. Iran already knows how to enrich, so the line between enrichment and no enrichment has already been crossed.

Q:   If you allow enrichment in Iran, even under strict safeguards, how do you propose to respond to a "soft breakout" by Iran, involving use of declared nuclear materials and facilities to pursue a nuclear weapon via gradual transgression of legal boundaries?

A:  IAEA material accounting is meticulous and surveillance possibilities considerable, particularly if installed to the state of the art and accompanied by remote camera surveillance and/or foreign technicians on the ground in a multinational facility. Under these conditions clandestine breakout from facilities under inspection would be very difficult.

Moreover, no breakout of any kind could occur without crossing clear, regularly-monitored "redlines" -- enriching uranium beyond 5 percent, diverting low-enriched uranium, excluding foreign inspectors, accumulating high-enriched uranium, etc. While enrichment is an authorized and dual-use activity (and proscribing it completely is therefore problematic), crossing any of the foregoing redlines would be an unambiguous signal of illicit intent, triggering a very high likelihood of a forceful response. Specifying these conditions in advance as "default conditions" that constitute a clear breach would make things even more explicit, and more consequential.   Under these circumstances, a completely clandestine route would seem far more attractive to Iran than any breakout involving safeguarded facilities. Our approach offers a window onto the clandestine path - through the Additional Protocol, broad-ranging monitoring possibilities, and possibly the presence of foreign technicians - that most likely will not be available under the baseline scenario of zero-declared-enrichment, even supposing it could be achieved. (The Additional Protocol is an optional protocol.)

These observations suggest that our approach of limited, multi-national enrichment in Iran is actually less risky than the alternative of zero-open-enrichment with no Additional Protocol in place. And it is much less risky than the most likely result of no agreement (i.e., ongoing enrichment with no Additional Protocol and other transparency measures in place, and continued hostile relations that may lead to a clandestine re-start of a weapons program, and possible armed conflict.)

Q:  Does it really make sense to concede the zero enrichment position right out of the gate for the new Administration? Won't the Administration look weak if it drops a sanctions-focused approach for a more conciliatory one?

A: If the change of course is framed right - and done first - the Administration will not look like it is rewarding Iran or weak, tactically or strategically. It will look principled by indicating a different philosophy and approach to the Iran relationship from the stance adopted by the previous Administration.  The new Administration only looks weak if it starts off in a bellicose posture and then has to back down. In any event, even a sanctions-based approach has to be coupled with a workable outcome. So far the zero-enrichment demand has failed, leaving the United States less safe than it would be under an approach that allows some enrichment in Iran under very close, nationwide surveillance and possible multilateral control. In fact, in our judgment, the United States is far more likely to achieve the goal of zero enrichment in Iran via a patient strategy of easing tensions and repairing the relationship, than through a confrontational approach featuring early, peremptory demands that galvanize Iranian resistance and from which we later retreat.

Q: At least five other countries have supported past demands for Iran to suspend enrichment of uranium.  What will they say if the United States proposes opening the door to a possible change of position?

A: Obviously, the United States should consult carefully with its allies before taking any action. We are confident that Russia and China will not object to a change of course: they do not support the current approach, but may support an approach that is closer to their view of how to proceed. Given the manifest failure of the current strategy, we are reasonably confident that Britain, France and Germany will accept our more pragmatic approach if it is properly explained.

Q:  What about the Security Council resolutions that instruct Iran to suspend enrichment of uranium?

A:   Appropriately-enacted resolutions of the United Nations Security Council are legally binding.  Should broadly acceptable, alternative arrangements be arrived at with Iran to achieve over-arching goals on the nuclear issue, then the appropriate action would be to seek approval of those arrangements from the Security Council. We would strongly advocate proceeding in this manner which is in general accord with the practice of the Council. By the same token, the ability of the Council to change positions, exercised on relatively rare occasions, is part of its mandate under the Charter and has not been seen as negatively affecting its authority in either a legal or political sense.

Q:  Won't allowing Iran to enrich encourage other countries in the Middle East to enrich?

A:   Iran's nuclear program predates the revolution. Enrichment has become a national industry in Iran and a symbol of independence. None of these circumstances apply to other nations in the region, and there is no commercial incentive to pursue enrichment.  In fact, other states in the region have proposed enrichment via multinational consortium.  The package of measures we are proposing could go far to defuse the Iran crisis while setting a new standard for a multilateral fuel cycle that would benefit the global nonproliferation regime. If the concern is that Iran's enriching will cause other nations in the region to want a weapon, we fail to see how allowing Iran to enrich uranium under full safeguards will somehow spark a nuclear arms race when Israel's bomb has not done so. Israel is far more hated and feared throughout the region than Iran.

Q: Would a multinational enrichment facility in Iran be economically viable?

A:  Commercial considerations should not drive an issue of this magnitude.  The cost of financing/subsidizing an appropriately manned and safeguarded facility in Iran is trivial compared to the potential costs of using force or of failing to resolve this matter.

Q: Hasn't Iran already rejected previous Western offers of positive incentives for cooperation on the nuclear file?

A:  An urban legend has grown up in some circles that the so-called "P5+1" group - Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and the United States - has already tried "engagement" in attempting to get Iranian cooperation on nuclear issues and was rebuffed, making further efforts at diplomacy probably pointless.  The facts are otherwise.

Following is the relevant text of the P5+1 offer to Iran as conveyed on June 16, 2008, largely reiterating a 2006 offer: ". . . the elements below [including support for light-water reactors,  fuel supply guarantees and other incentives] are proposed as topics for negotiations between [the P5+1 countries and Iran], as long as Iran verifiably suspends its enrichment related and reprocessing activities . . ." (emphasis supplied)

On any fair reading, this is not a specific offer so much as an outline for a negotiated settlement, discussion of which could not start until Iran had first met the Bush Administration's precondition for talks: Iran must first suspend all enrichment immediately.  This for Iran was a poison pill, whether intended as such or not.  Since then, Iran has greatly expanded its political and economic investment in enrichment, along with its enrichment capacity.  This development makes a halt to future, open enrichment both less likely to be achieved and less central to core security concerns going forward. As seen in this paper, such prior, unsuccessful efforts clearly do not exhaust the opportunities for diplomacy.

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Disclaimer

The Iran Nuclear Policy Group is a working group of the American Foreign Policy Project, a non-partisan organization devoted to convening top experts to collaborate online in developing sound policies and messages on the toughest foreign policy challenges.  This White Paper is the product of twelve members with diverse expertise and backgrounds, including former high-level diplomats and policy-makers and experts on non-proliferation and Iran. While group members strongly support the general policy thrust and judgments reflected in this statement, they may not necessarily all concur with every specific statement or recommendation contained therein.

Members of the Iran Nuclear Policy Group

Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering (chair)
Vice-Chairman, Hills & Company; Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, Israel and other nations

Ambassador Pickering has had a career spanning five decades as a U.S. diplomat, serving as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador to Russia, India, Israel, Nigeria, Jordan and El Salvador. He also served on assignments in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He holds the personal rank of Career Ambassador, the highest in the U.S. Foreign Service. He has held numerous other positions at the State Department, including Executive Secretary and Special Assistant to Secretaries Rogers and Kissinger and Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans, Environmental and Scientific Affairs. He is currently Vice-chairman of Hills & Company, an international consulting firm providing advice to U.S. businesses on investment, trade, and risk assessment issues abroad, particularly in emerging market economies. He is based in Washington, DC.

Associate Professor of Political Science at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs; Founding Director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program

Dr. Boroujerdi is the author of Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism (1996). His articles have appeared in numerous scholarly journals and more than a dozen edited books and Persian-language journals. He is the general editor of the Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East series published by Syracuse University Press and served for seven years (2000 to 2007) as the book review editor of the International Journal of Middle East Studies. He is currently engaged in a major study of the current and next generation of political leaders in Iran.

Peter Crail

Nonproliferation analyst, Arms Control Association

Peter Crail's work focuses on nuclear and missile proliferation in the Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia, as well as strategic export controls and efforts to prevent terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. He has been quoted and interviewed as an expert on these issues for the Washington Times, Reuters, the Associated Press, Al-Jazeera, and USA Today. He previously served as a consultant for the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs and an analyst for the Center for Non-proliferation Studies.

Farideh Farhi
Independent Researcher and Affiliate Graduate Faculty at the University of Hawai'i-Manoa

Farideh Farhi is the author of States and Urban-Based Revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua along with numerous articles and book chapters on contemporary Iranian politics and foreign policy. She also authored the Asia Society's report on Iran's 2001 elections; the International Crisis Group's report on the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran; and, a soon to be published World Bank study, Contested Governance and the Need for Reform: The Case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. She has taught at the University of Colorado, Boulder; University of Hawai'i; University of Tehran and Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran. Her research sponsors include the United States Institute of Peace, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars where she was recently a Public Policy Scholar. She travels widely and lectures regularly on Iranian politics and foreign relations at research institutions in Washington, D.C. and around the country.

Harold Feiveson

Senior Research Policy Scientist, Program on Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and Int'l  Affairs (WWS), Princeton University

Dr. Feiveson's principal research interests are in the fields of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy policy.  He has taught numerous courses, policy task forces, and graduate workshops relating to nuclear weapons, energy, and national and global environmental issues. Feiveson's recent publications relating to nuclear weapons policy discuss measures to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including a universal ban on the production of weapons-useable material and on nuclear weapons testing.  His research relating to nuclear energy policy has focused on measures, such as a ban on the reprocessing of nuclear reactor fuel, which could strengthen the separation between nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear energy activities. Along with Professor von Hippel, he was the co-founder of the Program on Science and Global Security and co-director until July 2006.  He is the Editor and one of the founders of the international journal, Science & Global Security.

Colonel Sam Gardiner

US Air Force (retired)

Colonel Gardiner is a strategist and teacher.  He has taught a course on strategy at the National War College for 20 years.  He has taught strategy at the Air War College, Army War College and Naval War College.  In addition, he was a visiting scholar at the Swedish Defense College.   He designs and conducts war games.  He has conducted games for the Air Force, Navy, Army, CIA, and Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department.  He has conducted simulations and written extensively on the military options for Iran.  His most recent paper, Dangerous and Getting More Dangerous: The Delicate Situation Between the U.S. and Iran, was published by the Century Foundation.  His combat decorations include the Bronze Star.  His other decorations include the Legion of Merit.

Mohsen M. Milani
Professor of Politics and Chair of the Department of Government and International Affairs, University of South Florida

Mohsen Milani's classic book, The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution, has been used as required reading in many universities in the U.S., Europe, Japan, and Canada. Its Persian translation is also one of the required readings for an exit course students must complete before graduating from the institutions of higher learning in Iran. Professor Milani has written more than fifty articles, book chapters, and encyclopedia entries about the Persian Gulf, Iran's revolution, and Iran's foreign and security policies. He has served as a research fellow at Harvard University, Oxford University's St. Antony's College, and the Foscari University in Venice, Italy. Dr. Milani is a frequent speaker at international and national conferences on Iran and the Persian Gulf. He is the Book Series Editor on Governance and International Relations in the Middle East, University Press of Florida.

Senior Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Ambassador (ret.) William Green Miller has been a Senior Advisor for Search for Common Ground's US-Iran Program since 1998. The former US Ambassador to Ukraine (1993-1998) served six years in Iran as an FSO and fourteen years on Capitol Hill as staff director for three Senate committees. He served as President of the American Committee on US-Soviet relations and the International Foundation. Formerly an Associate Dean and professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Ambassador Miller is presently a Senior Policy Fellow the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Richard Parker
Founder and Executive Director, American Foreign Policy Project

Dr. Parker is a professor at University of Connecticut School of Law and Founder and Executive Director of the new American Foreign Policy Project (AFPP). AFPP convenes large teams of top experts to collaboratively develop sound policy on the toughest national security and foreign policy issues of the day. It translates these policies into effective messages in ready-to-use talking point format, and then disseminates these messages to leaders, key influencers and the public through a variety of channels - briefings, traditional media, blogs, and a unique, highly-searchable website, americanforeignpolicy.org. Dr. Parker has served as Assistant General Counsel in the Office of the United States Trade Representative and Special Counsel to the Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. He holds a B.A. in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University, a J.D. from Yale Law School, and a D.Phil. in International Relations from Oxford University, which he attended as a Rhodes Scholar.

Trita Parsi
Award-winning author; President, National Iranian-American Council

Trita Parsi is the author of Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States, which won the 2008 Silver Medal Recipient of the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Book Award. Fluent in Persian/Farsi, Dr. Parsi is regularly consulted by Western, Middle Eastern and Asian governments on Middle East affairs, and he is a co-founder and current President of the National Iranian American Council, a non-partisan, non-profit organization promoting Iranian-American participation in American civic life. His articles on Middle East affairs have been published in the numerous newspapers and magazines and he is a frequent commentor on radio and television news shows. He has also worked for the Swedish Permanent Mission to the UN, serving in the Security Council handling the affairs of Afghanistan, Iraq, Tajikistan and Western Sahara, and the General Assembly's Third Committee addressing human rights in Iran, Afghanistan, Myanmar and Iraq. Dr. Parsi was born in Iran and grew up in Sweden.

Gary G. Sick
Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University SIPA's Middle East Institute; Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at SIPA

Professor Sick served on the National Security Council under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan. He was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis. Sick is a Captain (Ret.) in the U.S. Navy, with service in the Persian Gulf, North Africa, and the Mediterranean. He was the deputy director for International Affairs at the Ford Foundation from 1982 to 1987, where he was responsible for programs relating to U.S. foreign policy. He is also a member of the board (emeritus) of Human Rights Watch in New York and the chairman of the Advisory Committee of Human Rights Watch/Middle East.

James Walsh
Research Associate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Dr. Walsh's research and writings focus on international security, and in particular, topics involving weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. He has testified before the United States Senate on the issue of nuclear terrorism as well as on Iran's nuclear program. He has also chaired the Harvard University International Working Group on Radiological Terrorism. Among his current projects are two series of dialogues on nuclear issues, one with representatives from North Korea and one with leading figures in Iran. He has appeared frequently in the media as an expert on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism issues, including more than 300 appearances on CNN. His most recent publications include a chapter on Iran's nuclear program in Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation: Strategies for Overlapping Dangers and a chapter on nuclear weapons in A Muslim-Christian Study and Action Guide to the Nuclear Weapons Danger. He has also published Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation for the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by Hans Blix (2006).

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